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In 1983, the Texas Legislature
enacted an "outcry statute," which
provided that a conviction for a sex-
ual offense could be based solely on
the testimony of the victim if within
six months of the alleged offense the
victim told a third person about the
offense. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art.
38.07. The provision set out an
exception for victims who were
under the age of 14 at the time of
the offense; their testimony alone
could support a conviction even if
they had not told a third person
within the required period of time.
The purpose of such a statutory pro-
vision seems to be twofold. First,
the statute addresses the concern
that sexual offenses, in particular,
are easy to fabricate. Related to this
is the belief that there is a greater
chance that a victim would fabricate
such an offense. Thus, the assump-
tion underlying the statute is that if
a victim made a timely outcry, it is
less likely that the victim fabricated
the occurrence of the offense.
Second, such a statute has the effect
of creating an exception to the rule
against hearsay.
From the perspective of the prose-
cution, this is important because a
jury may be unlikely to believe the
victim unless there is evidence of a
timely outcry. The statute allows
the prosecution to bolster the credi-
bility of the victim by introducing
her out-of-court statements about
the crime. In addition, however,
where the victim is of a certain age
and where the only evidence against
the defendant is the victim's testi-
mony, the statute requires evidence
of an "outcry" by the victim.
The legislature amended this provi-
sion in 1993 to enlarge the scope of
the exception such that the testimo-
ny of a victim under the age of 18
could support a sexual offense con-
viction even if the victim had not
informed a third person of the inci-
dent within the requisite amount of
time-which the amendment
increased to one year.
ISSUE
Does retroactive application of the
change in the outcry statute violate
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the ex post facto clause of the
Constitution as a "law that alters
the legal rules of evidence, and
receives less, or different testimony"
than required at the time of the
offense? Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3
Dall.) 386, 390 (1798).
FACTS
Petitioner, Scott Leslie Carmell, was
charged with and convicted of eight
counts of indecency with a child,
five counts of sexual assault, and
two counts of aggravated sexual
assault. All counts involved one vic-
tim, KM, Carmell's stepdaughter,
and spanned a time period from
February 1991, when KM was 12
years old, to March 1995, when she
was 17. Carmell argues that four of
those counts were based on inci-
dents that occurred before the 1993
amendments to the outcry statute
became effective, and when the vic-
tim was older than 14 but younger
than 18 years of age. While the
offenses took place before the 1993
amendments, the trial court applied
the 1993 version of the statute, thus
relieving the prosecution of the
requirement that it present evi-
dence of an outcry as to those
counts, since KM was younger than
the age of 18.
Carmell contends that under the
1983 version of the statute, he
could not have been convicted on
the four counts, because the state
would have been required to pre-
sent evidence that KM made a time-
ly outcry as to each count, since she
was 14 years of age or older at the
time. Carmell claims that the
retroactive application of the 1993
version of the outcry statute violat-
ed the ex post facto clause of the
Constitution.
Carmell appealed to the Court of
Appeals of Texas in Fort Worth.
That court rejected Carmell's ex
post facto argument, stating that the
1993 version of the statute "does
not increase the punishment nor
change the elements of the offense
that the State must prove." Carmell
v. State, 963 S.W.2d 833 (Tex.App.
- Fort Worth 1998, pet. ref'd) (per
curiam). The Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals refused Carmell's
petition for discretionary review.
Given the appellate court's holding
rejecting the ex post facto law argu-
ment, the appellate court did not
determine whether Carmell's con-
victions on the four counts at issue
were in fact based solely on the vic-
tim's testimony. Thus, as a prelimi-
nary matter, the state argues that
article 38.07 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure is inapplicable
because the State presented evi-
dence in addition to that of the vic-
tim. While the Supreme Court could
determine that Carmell's conviction
was based upon more than the
testimony of the victim, this is
unlikely. It seems that the purpose
of granting certiorari in this case is
to clarify the scope of the ex post
facto clause.
The Supreme Court granted certio-
rari on June 14, 1998.
CASE ANALYSIS
Carmell's arguments against the
retroactive application of the 1993
version of the outcry statute raise
the question of the proper scope of
the ex post facto clause of the
Constitution. The Constitution pro-
vides that "No state shall ... pass
any ... ex post facto law." Art. I, §
10. In Calder v. Bull, the United
States Supreme Court made clear
that this provision applied to
retroactive penal legislation only
and not to civil statutes. 3 U.S. (3
Dall.) 386 (1798). In addition, the
Court set out the following cate-
gories of laws that the clause pro-
hibits: (1) laws that criminalize con-
duct that was innocent when done;
(2) laws that make a crime more
serious than when it was commit-
ted; (3) laws that inflict greater pun-
ishment than provided for when the
offense was committed; and (4)
"every law that alters the legal rules
of evidence, and receives less, or
different, testimony than the law
required at the time of the commis-
sion of the offense, in order to con-
vict the offender." Calder, 3 U.S.
at 390.
Carmell relies on the fourth catego-
ry to support his argument that
retroactive application of revised
article 38.07 violated the ex post
facto clause, and thus raises two
questions. First, is the fourth cate-
gory in Calder still a viable defini-
tion of an ex post facto law? If the
fourth category is still applicable,
the second issue relates to the scope
of that category. That is, what
standard are courts to use in
determining whether a law comes
within the fourth description of ex
post facto laws?
Carmell argues that the 1993
change to the outcry statute essen-
tially permitted the State to convict
him on less evidence than the law
required before 1993. Specifically,
because the 1983 version would
have required evidence of a timely
outcry by KM, the lack of such evi-
dence would have made his convic-
tions on the relevant four counts
impossible as a matter of law. In
fact, there is Texas precedent for
the proposition that where a convic-
tion for a sexual offense is based
solely on the testimony of the vic-
tim and there is no evidence of a
timely outcry, the evidence is insuf-
ficient to support the conviction.
See e.g., Scoggan v. State, 799
S.W.2d 679 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990)
(defendant could not be convicted
of sexual assault of a child solely on
the testimony of the victim when
the victim was older than 14 at the
time of the offense and there was no
evidence of outcry to a third person
within six months of the offense).
(Continued on Page 138)
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The State explains that the sexual
offense charges brought against
Carmell are based on statutes in
effect at the time the offenses
occurred, and that the elements of
those statutes remained unchanged.
The State then asserts that article
38.07 (either the 1983 or the 1993
version) has no impact on the ele-
ments of the sexual offenses
involved, on any defenses to those
offenses, nor on the State's burden of
proving each element of the offenses
beyond a reasonable doubt. The
State further claims that Carmell's
argument unduly expands the scope
of Calder's fourth category.
Analogizing to an early case decided
by the Supreme Court, Hopt v.
Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884), the state
of Texas claims that the effect of
article 38.07 is simply to allow the
jury to rely on evidence that it pre-
viously could not have considered
in determining whether the defen-
dant committed the crime. In Hopt,
the Court rejected an ex post facto
challenge to a law that eliminated a
rule stating that convicted felons
were incompetent to testify. The
Court reasoned that the law "simply
enlarge[d] the class of persons who
may be competent to testify in
criminal cases" and thus did not
"alter the degree, or lessen the
amount or measure" of evidence
necessary to convict. 110 U.S. at
589. Similarly, in Thompson v.
Missouri, 171 U.S. 380 (1898), the
Court held that a change in a law
that permitted admission of more
circumstantial evidence against the
defendant was not an ex post facto
law. Such a law leaves "unimpaired
the right of the jury to determine
the sufficiency or effect of the evi-
dence declared to be admissible."
171 U.S at 387.
Carmell distinguishes Hopt and
Thompson by focusing on the lan-
guage in the fourth category of
Calder, which refers to every law
that "alters ... and receives less ...
testimony" than what was required
at the time of the offense. In con-
trast to Hopt and Thompson, which
involved laws that increased the
amount of testimony and evidence
that would be admitted and consid-
ered by a jury, the revision of article
38.07 that is at issue in the present
case decreases the testimony
required, in that it eliminates the
requirement of the victim's outcry
when the victim was younger than
18 at the time of the offense.
However, one response to Carmell's
distinction between laws that admit
previously inadmissible evidence
and laws that eliminate the need for
certain evidence is that this distinc-
tion asks the wrong question.
Rather, the critical inquiry may be
whether the law has the effect of
altering the substance of the offense
or merely alters the mode in which
the trial is conducted or the nature
of the evidence that may be
received and considered.
This "procedural versus substan-
tive" inquiry, however, is not always
helpful. In fact, the Supreme Court
has more recently stated that "by
simply labeling a law 'procedural,' a
legislature does not thereby immu-
nize it from scrutiny under the ex
post facto clause." Collins v.
Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 46 (1990).
Thus, the Court recognizes that
some procedural laws might affect
matters of substance. However, as
one commentator has pointed out,
the Court has yet to invalidate a
retroactive change in an evidentiary
rule. Nonetheless, since the Court
has acknowledged the fact that sub-
stantive changes may be accom-
plished by evidentiary or procedural
changes, it is unlikely to find that
the fourth category in Calder is no
longer applicable. As to the scope of
the category, the Court has yet to
create a standard for applying this
distinction.
Laws eliminating corroboration
requirements in another context
have created a split among the
lower courts. Where the jurisdic-
tions involved had required that
accomplice testimony be corrobo-
rated and later eliminated that cor-
roboration requirement, the ques-
tion was whether the retroactive
application of the "no corrobora-
tion" rule violated the ex post facto
clause. In Murphy v. Sowders, 801
F.2d 205 (6th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 480 U.S. 941 (1987), the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit held that the legislature did
not violate the ex post facto clause
when it retroactively applied a law
that eliminated the requirement of
evidence to corroborate an accom-
plice's testimony. The court rea-
soned that the prior law requiring
corroboration was in effect a law
like the one at issue in Hopt, which
merely removed restrictions on the
competency of certain types of wit-
nesses, and therefore "simply
enlarged the class of persons who
were decreed to be competent to
testify" and did not alter the prose-
cution's burden of proof. Murphy,
801 F.2d at 211.
The Third Circuit, however, came to
a different conclusion as to precise-
ly the same type of change in evi-
dentiary rules. In Government of
the Virgin Islands v. Civil, 591 F.2d
255 (3rd Cir. 1979), the court found
a violation of the ex post facto
clause when the repeal of the cor-
roboration requirement for accom-
plice testimony was retroactively
applied. In part, the court relied on
language in prior Supreme Court
cases that focused on whether a
"substantial right" was involved.
However, in Collins, the Court over-
ruled those cases. 497 U.S. at 52.
Nonetheless, in Civil, the Third
Circuit also pointed out that the
repealed statute had framed the cor-
roboration requirement in terms of
sufficiency of the evidence, similar
Issue No. 3138
to the statute involved in Carmell's
case. The statute in Civil provided
that "No conviction may be had
upon the testimony of an accom-
plice unless it be corroborated,"
thus indicating that the evidence
would be insufficient as a matter of
law where it consists solely of the
accomplice's testimony. Civil, 591
F.2d at 257. In addition, several
state courts are split on the issue of
retroactive elimination of corrobora-
tion requirements. Carmell argues
for an analysis similar to that of the
court in Civil, while the state of
Texas claims that the reasoning of
the Murphy court is more consis-
tent with the jurisprudence inter-
preting the ex post facto clause.
In addition to his arguments regard-
ing the nature and effect of the
1993 revision to article 38.07,
Carmell also argues that the
Supreme Court should consider the
purpose of the revision. Texas
courts have stated that the purpose
of the 1993 revision to article 38.07
was to make it easier to convict sex
offenders. See e.g., Bowers v. State,
914 S.W.2d 213 (Tex. App. - El Paso
1996, pet. ref'd). Carmell argues
that this is relevant because the
purpose of the ex post facto clause
is to protect against arbitrary, capri-
cious, and vindictive lawmaking
directed at unpopular groups. Thus,
Carmell claims that sex offenders
are an unpopular group targeted by
the revision to article 38.07, and
that retroactive application of such
a statute therefore violates the ex
post facto clause. This argument is
unavailable in cases like Murphy
and Civil, where the change in the
evidentiary rule applied to all crimi-
nal cases and to accomplices called
as witnesses for the prosecution as
well as for the defense. In contrast,
in the present case, the change in
article 38.07 applies only to sexual
offenses and only to the testimony
of the victim, whom only the prose-
cution will call. The government
counters that the ex post facto
clause is also aimed at ensuring that
individuals have fair warning of
what conduct is criminal. Where the
change in article 38.07 did not alter
the fact that Carmell's conduct with
his stepdaughter was illegal, Carmell
had fair warning of the criminal
nature of his conduct. Nonetheless,
these arguments do not address the
pivotal procedural/substantive
dichotomy.
SIGNIFICANCE
This case presents the Supreme
Court with an opportunity to pro-
vide guidance to lower courts on the
scope and meaning of the fourth
category of ex post facto laws in
Calder. As mentioned earlier, there
is a possibility that the Court could
eliminate that category altogether.
Such an elimination could be based
on the controversy surrounding the
history of the category. In Calder,
Justice Chase examined specific his-
torical examples to which he
matched each category. The state of
Texas, the solicitor general, and
some commentators argue that the
example matched with the fourth
category is in fact an example of a
bill of attainder, not an ex post facto
law. However, in Collins, the
Supreme Court mentioned the
debate surrounding the historical
discussion but stated that the Court
had and would continue to adhere
to the views expressed by Justice
Chase. Collins, 497 U.S. at 41 n.2.
Assuming the Court does not dis-
turb the four categories set out in
Calder, the next question is how the
Court will apply that category.
While the Court might dispense
with the procedural/substantive
dichotomy, this seems unlikely.
Within the paradigm of that classifi-
cation, the Court might continue to
give meaning to it on a case-by-case
basis, thus simply resolving the con-
troversy involved in the type of cor-
roboration statute at issue in
Carmell by comparing and con-
trasting it with the types of statutes
considered in prior cases. Ideally,
the Court will set out a standard for
evaluating when a change in an evi-
dentiary rule impacts the substance
of an offense. Thus, it will be impor-
tant for the Court to examine the
policies underlying the ex post facto
clause and decide whether the guid-
ing policy should be the original
one; that is, to guard against arbi-
trary and vindictive lawmaking by
the legislature. James v. United
States, 366 U.S. 213, 247 n.3
(1961). If so, then the Court will
examine the purposes for the revi-
sion to article 38.07. Alternatively,
the Court could state that providing
fair warning to individuals that
their conduct is criminal is the
touchstone of the ex post facto
clause. Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S.
423, 430 (1987).
Once the Court determines the
dominant policy underlying the ex
post facto clause, it must then
decide whether that policy is
offended by an evidentiary rule
constructed as a standard for deter-
mining the sufficiency of the evi-
dence to convict the defendant.
That is, it must decide whether a
statute that requires a specific type
of corroboration of the victim's tes-
timony (a timely "outcry" to a third
person) merely relates to the
method of proving the case, or
whether it affects the substance of
the offense.
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